Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s first year in office has been nothing short of a diplomatic whirlwind, marked by a bold and highly personalized approach to engaging the Islamic world. But here’s where it gets controversial: while his leader-led diplomacy has injected new energy into Indonesia’s global standing, it risks becoming a double-edged sword without institutional backing. Could Prabowo’s reliance on centralized decision-making undermine long-term sustainability and coherence in foreign policy?**
Prabowo’s tenure has been defined by high-profile outreach to Muslim-majority nations, particularly on issues like Palestine, coupled with frequent international travel and summit diplomacy. For the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, this aligns with Indonesia’s historical diplomatic identity. Even his predecessor, Joko Widodo, despite being seen as domestically focused, pursued Gulf investments and attended Organisation of Islamic Cooperation summits. Yet, Prabowo’s approach stands out for its intensity and visibility, earning him a reputation as a foreign policy-centric president.
And this is the part most people miss: while Prabowo’s activism has delivered domestic political gains and economic opportunities, its success hinges on institutionalization. Without embedding these efforts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies, Indonesia’s engagement risks becoming fragmented, prone to groupthink, and unsustainable. The challenge is clear: Prabowo must transform his presidential activism into state capacity to turn visibility into genuine influence.
Prabowo’s shift in priorities is also noteworthy. The ambitious project to build a new national capital has taken a backseat, while initiatives like the free meals program and a giant sea wall have absorbed significant state resources. This raises questions: Is this a strategic reallocation of focus, or a departure from long-term planning? More importantly, are these changes being institutionalized for continuity?
Prabowo’s centralized approach, bypassing traditional diplomatic channels, has sparked debate. While it offers speed and efficiency, it sacrifices precision and risks sidelining career diplomats. This concentration of power within a loyal inner circle heightens the danger of groupthink, where dissenting voices are muffled. Without institutional checks, particularly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prabowo risks operating in an echo chamber where loyalty trumps critical evaluation.
Three domestic factors shape Prabowo’s strategy. First, unlike Widodo, Prabowo enjoys strong support from Islamic organizations like Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, granting him diplomatic flexibility. His focus has shifted from seeking endorsements to maintaining coalitions. Second, appointments like Annis Matta as deputy foreign minister for Islamic world diplomacy and the elevation of allies like Haikal Hassan reflect a political reorganization aimed at consolidating executive control. Third, Prabowo is diversifying Indonesia’s foreign policy toolkit, pursuing defense cooperation with Turkey and Middle Eastern nations while maintaining economic engagement and Islamic solidarity rhetoric.
A survey by Indikator Politik reveals that Indonesians view Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as key allies, suggesting that public awareness is not the issue—delivery is. Prabowo’s personalized diplomacy, while effective in the short term, must be institutionalized to avoid pitfalls like groupthink and controversy. Symbolic gestures, such as frequent visits to Muslim countries, must translate into tangible outcomes like implemented agreements and action plans.
Here’s the burning question: Can Prabowo’s leadership style evolve to balance presidential activism with institutional strength? Or will Indonesia’s foreign policy remain vulnerable to the whims of individual leadership? Share your thoughts in the comments—let’s spark a debate on the future of Indonesia’s diplomatic trajectory.
